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Abstract
The logic behind globalized advertising appeals is based on the premise that
cultural value systems are converging. Yet, there is no clear agreement regarding the
superiority of standardized campaigns vs. localized ones. One reason for this lack of
agreement deals with the extent to which various cultures share similar values. The
goal of this study is to apply a relatively new framework dealing with value differences
developed by Schwartz [Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 25 (1992) 1.] to New Zealand and
the USA by looking at the connection between these values and possessions. The
hypotheses received mix support. The results confirm that New Zealanders are
higher in Harmony and Affective Autonomy, and these values did, in part, affect
possessions and reasons for owning them. New Zealanders’ most valued
possessions were for environmental reasons, but they were no more likely to mention
enjoyment reasons than Americans. New Zealanders also did not mention
recreational possessions as more important, contrary to one of the hypotheses.
Nonetheless, the similarities between NZ and the USA were much greater than the
differences. The study provides valuable insight into how the meanings of important
possessions differ across cultures and illustrates the need to understand these
differences when designing marketing communications and positioning products in
foreign markets.

1. Introduction
As economic globalization intensifies, standardization of marketing mix elements can
be an optimal approach to gain economies of scale. Indeed, global standardization can be
seen in products, brands and advertising (van Raaij, 1997). Advertisers view standardized ad
campaigns as a panacea to rising costs from localized advertising in each market. However,
such standardization may not ‘‘fit’’ with the cultural variances around the world. De Mooij
(1998) views the argument that cultures are developing similar values as superficial and
misguided. She contends that national value systems are enduring, and these are integral to
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consumers’ perceptions of advertising. According to DeMooij (1998, p. xiv) ‘‘The success of a
business depends in the end on how well its products reach customers whose behavior is
affected by values that may vary in all kinds of unexpected ways from those of the business’
managers.’’ To ignore these differences is to invite failure.
Although companies such as Coca-Cola, McDonalds and Ralph Lauren have
succeeded with global advertising, many other firms have suffered from ignorance of cultural
differences. A recent example occurred in Mexico in 1998 when women were offended by
near-naked women in Wonderbra ads and boycotted their products until a particular
advertising campaign was withdrawn. As firms extend their reach to foreign markets, such
misunderstandings are likely. Hence, the crux of the problem is to identify differences in
values, determine how they influence product choice, and, subsequently, advertise
accordingly.
De Mooij (1998) contends that values are at the core of a culture and influence the
perception of symbols and rituals, among others. These values are acquired by mental
programming in the enculturation process. Without understanding a country’s core cultural
values, miscommunication in advertising is likely. These core values have a powerful
influence on a country’s characteristics and consumer behavior. Cultural values serve as the
criteria its members use to determine what behavior is appropriate, to guide self-presentation
and to justify their choices to others (Rokeach, 1973; Smith and Schwartz, 1997; Vinson et al.,
1977b). Within the context of consumer behavior, cultural values have been used to explain
patterns of behavior (Ford et al., 1995; Green and Alden, 1988; Tse et al., 1988; Wallendorf
and Arnould, 1988) and differences in attitudes (Andrews et al., 1991; Ger and Belk, 1966;
Grunert and Scherhom, 1990; Lee, 1993; Unger, 1995).
Despite Levitt’s (1983) assertion that the globalization of markets is inevitable due to
convergence of values, research suggests cultural differences persist. As such, research on
values can illuminate critical marketing dimensions related to advertising and product
positioning. Given this background, the goal of this study is to focus on the value differences
between the USA and New Zealand (NZ) and how these affect possessions. Without
understanding the importance of possessions, effective advertising appeals are unlikely,
especially pattern advertising using similar appeals for global markets. Effective
communication demands ‘‘knowing your customers’’ and the parameters that affect them
such as cultural values.
Most cross-cultural studies provide comparisons among cultural groups without a
strong underlying theory to explain differences. It is far better to explain observed differences
with a theory (Smith and Schwartz, 1997). In this paper, the cultural-level value theory
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proposed by Schwartz (1994a) is used to explore the relationship between cultural values
and important possessions. This theory provides a compelling and powerful perspective in
which to examine cultural differences. The USA and NZ were chosen since they are culturally
very similar, yet, past research has identified differences in consumption aspirations (Bryce
and Olney, 1991), consumer perceptions (Gordon and McKeage, 1997) and both personal
and cultural values (Schwartz, 1992, 1994a). Differences in values are likely to affect reasons
for ownership of possessions (Prentice, 1987).
The outline of this paper is as follows. First, we provide background literature on
cultural values, examine the Schwartz (1992) approach to measure culture and discuss the
significance of understanding important possessions. The hypotheses are presented in the
first part of the paper. After the methodology is discussed, the results concerning value
differences and important possessions are provided. The paper concludes with implications
and directions for future research.

2. Background and Hypotheses
‘‘Culture’’ has been described as a society’s personality or as the glue that binds
people together. As an explanatory variable, it allows the investigation of a society’s
dimensions such as its values. When used to characterize and distinguish between cultures,
values represent socially shared abstract ideas about what is good, right and desirable
(Hofstede, 1994). According to Smith and Schwartz (1997, p. 80), five common features of
values suggest that values: (1) are subjective and emotional beliefs; (2) refer to desirable
goals and act as modes of conduct that promote these goals; (3) transcend specific actions
and situations; (4) serve as guidelines to evaluate behavior; and (5) differ in how they are
prioritized as an ordered system.
Individuals acquire values through socialization by dominant groups and through
learning experiences (Schwartz, 1994a). Cultural values may take cognitive form as groups
respond to their environment and express their responses in the ‘‘language of specific values
about which they can then communicate’’ (Schwartz, 1994b, p. 21). Values may be ‘‘truisms’’;
people agree highly with the importance of particular values, but lack cognitive rationale
(Maio and Olson, 1998). Many attitudes and behaviors are based on values and, collectively,
they characterize cultures or nations.
Research has sought to identify ‘‘universal’’ values that characterize and distinguish
cultures (Kluckholn and Strodtbeck, 1961; Rokeach, 1973; Hofstede, 1980, 1991; Schwartz,
1994a; Trompenaars, 1993). Hofstede’s (1980) seminal study provided the first empirically
and conceptually based set of value dimensions to compare cultures. The value dimensions
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by Hofstede are widely accepted, yet, there are serious limitations (Bond and Forgas, 1984;
Leung, 1988; Kagitcibasi and Berry, 1989) concerning the number of values (Hofstede, 1980;
Schwartz 1994a), their universality (Shackleton and Ali, 1990; Schwartz, 1994a) and the
nature of the data (Schwartz, 1994a). The Value Survey (1973) with 36 values was one of the
initial approaches to measure values in marketing (Vinson et al., 1977a). Subsequently,
Kahle and Timmer (1983) developed a more parsimonious measure using nine values called
the List of Values (LOV). Unfortunately, these approaches have been criticized as
ethnocentric since they reflect USA culture (de Mooij 1998).
Recently, Schwartz (1994a) developed a new theory of cultural-level values and a
different method for measuring such values. To overcome limitations of previous research on
values, Schwartz used both Western and non-Western sources to derive cultural value
dimensions and controlled for meaning equivalence. The Schwartz cultural-level value
system, exhibiting both external and convergent validity, represents the most promising
framework for cross-cultural comparison of universal values (Bond and Smith, 1996). For this
reason, we used the Schwartz cultural-level approach to values.
2.1. Schwartz’s Cultural-level Values
Schwartz (1992) proposed that values represent a structure of interacting belief
systems, the collection of which constitutes culture. Undergirding this conceptualization,
Schwartz (1994a) developed a theory of conflicts and compatibilities among seven value
types as follows:
1. Conservatism: maintenance of the status quo, proprietary and restraint of actions that
might disrupt group solidarity and traditional order (e.g., social order, respect for tradition,
family security).
2. Intellectual Autonomy: independent ideas and the rights of the individual to pursue his/her
own intellectual directions (e.g., curiosity, creativity, broad mindedness).
3. Affective Autonomy: individual pursuit of affectively positive experiences (e.g., pleasure,
exciting life, a varied life).
4. Hierarchy: legitimacy of an unequal distribution of power roles and resources (e.g., social
power, authority, humility, wealth).
5. Egalitarian Commitment: transcendence of selfish interests to interests, which serve the
common good (e.g., equality, social justice, freedom, responsibility and honesty).
6. Mastery: getting ahead through self-assertion (e.g., ambition, success, competence).
7. Harmony: fitting harmoniously into the environment (e.g., unity with nature, protecting the
environment).
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Smith and Schwartz (1997, p. 86) postulated that each value type has ‘‘psychological,
practical and social consequences that may conflict or be compatible with the pursuit of other
types.’’ For example, if Autonomy is emphasized within a culture, the importance of
Conservatism (its opposite type) is depressed. ‘‘This is necessary in order to ensure
consistent socialization and reinforcement of behavior and to foster smooth institutional
functioning’’ (Schwartz 1994a, p. 98).
Schwartz (1994a) developed an instrument to measure cultural-level values by
selecting specific values to represent each value type; these were drawn from previous
research, including Rokeach’s (1973) value survey and from religious and philosophical
writings found in different cultures. By consulting survey instruments developed in other
cultures (Braithwaite and Law, 1985; Chinese Culture Connection, 1987; Hofstede, 1980),
Schwartz (1994a) avoided imposing a Western-imposed etic. The Schwartz approach
provides a cross-culturally validated instrument for measuring cultural-level values and a
comprehensive, near universal set of value types for studying cultural differences. Data
collected in 54 countries from approximately 44,000 subjects confirmed the theorized content
and structure of the cultural-level value types (Smith and Schwartz, 1997). In addition,
Schwartz ranked nations on each of the seven values. This approach can identify cultural
values; these values then can be used to understand the meaning that people attach to
products as discussed below.
Schwartz’s (1994a) ordering of nations for the cultural-level values reveals that NZ
and the USA are different on two value types only. Specifically, New Zealanders value
Affective Autonomy and Harmony more than Americans do (Schwartz, 1994a). Therefore,
the first hypothesis can be stated as:
Hypothesis 1: Americans, in comparison to New Zealanders, have lower scores on
Affective Autonomy and Harmony.
2.2. Cultural Values and the Private Meanings of Important Possessions
McCracken (1988) suggests that the identity of products is given meaning by the way
it is transmitted in the cultural system, while Belk (1988) views our identities as constructed
by our possessions (Belk, 1988). Hence, a person’s most important possessions reflect
personal values and inner self (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981; Wallendorf and
Arnould, 1988). Owners of possessions cultivate private meanings of possessions reflective
of their values (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981; Richins 1994a). The collectivity
of these private meanings relates to the totality of an individual’s thoughts and feelings about
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the importance of an object (Richins, 1994b). These private meanings of their possessions
characterize a person’s values (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, 1981).For instance,
a person who values ‘‘conservatism’’ may treasure an antique Hamilton pocket watch as a
family heirloom because it symbolizes family ties and heritage. Alternatively, a person who
values ‘‘mastery’’ may treasure the same watch because it symbolizes prestige and
enhances one’s self-concept.
An individual cultivates both social and personal meanings through interactions with
an object over time (Richins, 1994b); such private meanings of possessions are shaped by
and reflect one’s culture (Grunert and Juhl, 1995; Rokeach, 1973; Smith and Schwartz, 1997;
Vinson et al., 1977b). Hence, the private meanings associated with important possessions
should reflect dominant cultural values. Therefore, the following hypotheses can be stated:
Hypothesis 2: New Zealanders, in comparison to Americans, evaluate important
possessions (A) in terms of enjoyment because of their higher levels of Affective Autonomy
and (B) in terms of unity with nature and protection of the natural environment because of
their higher levels of Harmony.
2.3. Important Possessions
Affective Autonomy, expressed through enjoying life and pleasure, relates to freedom
of individual feeling and action. Accordingly, possessions that provide independence,
enjoyment or sensory pleasure may reflect affective freedom. The value Harmony focuses on
the environment and unity with nature. While it is difficult to own ‘‘the environment,’’ some
possessions may embody this value since they allow aesthetic and physical awareness of
the natural world. Although New Zealanders have higher levels of Affective Autonomy and
Harmony than Americans (Schwartz, 1994a), explaining how these differences affect
important possessions is problematic. For example, a person who values his/her wedding
ring as most important seems to differ markedly from a person who values his/her sports car.
However, on closer examination, both people may identify interpersonal reasons for the
importance of these possessions. The wedding ring may be cherished for its symbolic
association with a spouse, while the sports car may be favored because it came from a loved
one and symbolizes the importance of that relationship. Hence, different types of
possessions may provide similar private meanings. In contrast, the same possession can
provide radically different private meanings to different individuals. For example, recreational
equipment such as a bicycle could be valued because of its technical superiority to achieve
athletic excellence (i.e., mastery). Alternatively, the individual may value quiet bike rides in
the country and viewing nature’s beauty (i.e., Harmony). Consequently, the purchase of the
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bike may be motivated by values that are polar opposites, depending on the person.
Because cultural values influence self-images (Best and Williams, 1994; Markus and
Kitayama, 1991), cultural-level values may also influence peoples’ choices of their most
important possessions. Hence, the following hypothesis can be stated:
Hypothesis 3: New Zealanders, in comparison to Americans, identify their most
important possessions that reflect their higher ratings of Affective Autonomy and Harmony
(Schwartz, 1994a).

3. Method
3.1. Data Collection
Data were collected from the general population by mail surveys administered in the
USA and NZ. The USA data were obtained by selecting systematically 700 names from
telephone directories in a Mid-Atlantic state. Fundamental principles from the Dillman (1978,
1984) ‘‘Total Design Method’’ for telephone and mail surveys were used. The NZ sample of
1000 respondents was drawn systematically from the electoral roll whereby registered voters
had an equal opportunity of selection. Over 90% of the NZ population over the age of 18 are
registered voters. Usable questionnaires were returned by 46% (N=322) of those sampled in
the USA and 45% (N=446) in the NZ sample.

3.1.1. Measures
3.1.1.1. Values
The Schwartz (1994a) Value Inventory and the recommended procedure were used
to measure the importance of the seven culture-level value types. The instrument asks
respondents to rank and then rate various values. It consists of 45 items (as featured in Table
1) that measure the seven value types: Hierarchy, Mastery, Affective Autonomy, Intellectual
Autonomy, Egalitarian Commitment, Harmony, and Conservatism. The alpha coefficients (to
measure reliability) for the USA and NZ samples were respectively: .60 and .62 for
Hierarchy; .66 and .60 for Mastery; .68 and .75 for Affective Autonomy; .61 and .59 for
Intellectual Autonomy; .73 and .72 for Egalitarian Commitment; .78 and .73 for Harmony;
and .80 and .83 for Conservatism. These reliabilities are comparable to those reported by
Schwartz (1994a) and sufficient for reliability.

3.1.1.2. Important possessions.
Respondents identified their most important possessions by responding to the
following statement: ‘‘Many people have a few possessions that they care a lot about or that
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are especially important to them. In the space below, please identify your most prized
possessions and explain why they are important to you.’’ Respondents were asked to list
their three most important possessions and the reasons for their importance.
Using Richins (1994a,b) framework, possessions were coded using 13 groups as
follows: sentimental objects, assets, transportation, practical objects, recreational, personal
appearance, extension of self, aesthetic and other. Given the limitations in her categorization
scheme, three additional categories were added: (1) people/friendships; (2) pets; and (3)
possessions such as plants and gardens that emphasize the environment. The reasons
given for the importance of the possessions were content analyzed using the coding scheme
developed by Richins (1994a,b), which was initially designed to examine the relationship
between possessions and personal values. The categories were utilitarian, enjoyment,
interpersonal ties, identity, financial aspects, appearance related, ownership/control and
other/ unclassified. Because Richins developed the scheme using a different population,
additional content categories (which emerged from the data) were also included. These five
additional categories concerned possession value based on educational value, information
value, irreplaceability, health and the object’s ability to create unity with nature or to protect
the environment.
Both possessions and reasons were content analyzed independently by two judges
for the American sample and two different judges for the NZ sample. Because of some
language nuances, it was appropriate to use judges familiar with their colloquialisms and
jargon. These judges were trained in advance to insure consistent coding. Any
disagreements were resolved through discussion between judges. For possessions, coder
agreement was 95% for the USA sample and 97% for the NZ sample. For the reasons of
their importance, coder agreement was 94% for NZ sample and 93% for the US sample.

3.1.2. Sample Characteristics
An attempt was made to match the sampling frames with national proportions on
three demographic dimensions: location of residence (i.e., urban, nonurban); income; and
age. These three variables were selected because of their potential impact on questions
related to values and consumption. For location of residence, both samples for the USA and
NZ were proportional to their national breakdowns. For the US, 63% were from an urbanized
area and 37% were from a nonurbanized area (US Bureau of Census, 1990). Similarly, the
NZ respondents were 62% urban and 38% nonurban (Statistics NZ, 1997). Regarding age
and income, the samples for the USA and NZ were also comparable to the general
population for each country.
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4. Analysis and Results
4.1. Testing of Hypothesis 1: Comparison of Cultural-level Values
Repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test for value
differences. Country (USA/NZ) served as the independent variable, and the seven
cultural-level value types — Conservatism, Egalitarian Commitment, Harmony, Mastery,
Hierarchy, Affective Autonomy and Intellectual Autonomy — served as the dependent
variables in the analysis. The traditional univariate F statistics resulting from simple ANOVAs
were not valid because of the correlations among the value types. In order to test the simple
main effects of country (USA/NZ), it was necessary to calculate the error estimate pooled
between-and within-subjects variation (Winer et al., 1991).
Hypothesis 1 was supported as shown by the statistical differences on three of the
values in Table 2. Specifically, the USA respondents were higher in Conservatism, lower in
Harmony, and lower in Affective Autonomy. Although this result on Conservatism differs from
Schwartz (1994a), it is probably because Schwartz’s respondents were primarily
schoolteachers — a highly educated group — while those in our sample were a cross section
of the general population in NZ.

4.2. Testing of Hypothesis 2: Private Meanings of Possessions
With respect to the private meanings of possessions, it was hypothesized that New
Zealanders would be more likely to name reasons of enjoyment and environment for the
importance of their prized possessions. The USA sample provided 1132 reasons for valuing
the 823 possessions they characterized as important — an average of 1.4 reasons per
possession. New Zealanders provided 1632 reasons for valuing their 1047 most important
possessions — an average of 1.6 reasons per possession. Table 3 features the
categorization of these reasons.
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To determine if New Zealanders provided different private meanings for the
importance of their prized possessions compared to Americans, z tests for differences of
proportions were also used. Hypothesis 3 was only partially supported. Consistent with their
value of Harmony, Table 3 shows that New Zealanders listed environmental reasons for
valuing their important possession more frequently than Americans (z=3.43; P<.001).
However, New Zealanders were no more likely to mention enjoyment as a reason for valuing
their possessions (z=1.51, P<.10), which was contrary to our expectations given the value of
Affective Autonomy for New Zealanders. Other differences between the two countries were
also evident. New Zealanders were more likely than Americans to value possessions for
interpersonal (z=-4.05, P<.01) and financial reasons (z=-2.99, P<.01), but Americans were
more likely to value possessions for utilitarian (z=2.53, P<.05), appearance-related (z=4.06,
P<.001) and ownership and control (z=3.60, P<.001) reasons.
A final analysis was conducted to see if New Zealanders and Americans identify
different reasons why the same type of possession is important (e.g., Are recreational
possessions predominantly valued for enjoyment reasons, or assets for financial reasons?).
Previous studies investigating the private meanings of possessions have not examined this
relationship (e.g., Prentice, 1987; Richins, 1994a,b). Findings indicate that New Zealanders,
compared to Americans, were more likely to value assets (z=-2.3, P<.05) and recreational
items (z=-2.63, P<.01) for interpersonal reasons and transportation (z=-2.45, P<.05) for
financial reasons. In contrast, Americans were more likely to value transportation (z=3.41,
P<.001) and appearance-related possessions (z=2.46, P<.001) for interpersonal reasons.
4.3. Testing of Hypothesis 3: Types of Possessions
z Tests for differences of proportions were used to test whether New Zealanders and
Americans differed in the types of possessions they identified as important. These results
appear in Table 4 and partially support Hypothesis 3. Respondents in the USA and NZ listed
on average 2.5 and 2.4 valued possessions, respectively. New Zealanders were more likely
to identify environmental possessions as important (z=-3.88, P<.001), but were less likely to
identify recreational possessions as important (z=2.01, P<.05). Americans were also more
likely to identify practical objects (z=3.47, P<.001), appearance-related possessions (z=7.41,
P<.001) and aesthetic objects (z=5.34, P<.001) as important. New Zealanders were more
likely to identify sentimental objects (z=-5.63, P>.001) and possessions representing
extensions of the self (z=-3.37, P<.001) as important. In addition, New Zealanders were more
likely to identify people/friendships as their most important possessions (z=-2.67, P<.01) than
Americans.
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5. Discussion and Implications
The first research question guiding this study concerned the differences in cultural
values between NZ and the USA. New Zealanders value Harmony and Affective Autonomy
more than Americans. The latter finding is consistent with previous research examining
differences between the USA and NZ (cf. Bryce and Olney, 1991). Unlike the Schwartz’s
(1994a,b) findings, Americans, in general, placed more importance on the Conservatism
value than those in NZ.
When examining how value differences were related to the important possessions for
respondents from the two countries (i.e., Hypothesis 3), NZ and the United States are more
similar than distinct. Their cultural-level value hierarchies are nearly the same, and the top
four categories in which respondents identified important possessions were almost identical.
The four categories for New Zealanders were assets (23%), sentimental objects (21%),
transportation (15%) and recreation objects (9%). Similarly, the top four categories identified
by Americans were assets (22%), transportation (16%), recreation objects (12%) and
sentimental objects (11%). Only the frequency of these categories differed between the two
countries. These frequencies, however, were most noticeable and quite substantial for
interpersonal items.
New Zealanders were far more likely to identify sentimental objects and
people/friendships as important possessions, possessions that have a retrospective
orientation. Sentimental objects such as family heirlooms and photos act as symbols of
familial and personal history and illustrate an outlook more focused on the past. Likewise,
possessions representing extensions of the self, such as souvenirs and trophies, serve as
records of previous accomplishments. In comparison, Americans seem more pragmatic,
concerned with the present. The recreational possessions (e.g., sporting equipment) and
practical objects (e.g., appliances and tools) identified by Americans as important offer their
owners immediate benefits. Hence, the finding may apply to the design of advertising for the
two countries; appeals drawing on nostalgia are likely to be more effective in NZ, whereas
American consumers may be more drawn to products that satisfy immediate desires.
Americans were also more likely to value personal appearance (e.g., clothing and
jewelry) and aesthetic (e.g., paintings and antiques) possessions. Wallendorf and Arnould
(1988) theorize that the value of aesthetic possessions often relates to a need to enact social
differentiation. Art objects, particularly rare and unique ones, help people to express their
individuality and, thus, to differentiate themselves from mainstream consumer culture. The
fact that Americans were more likely to value ‘‘individuating’’ objects (e.g., artwork) might be
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partially explained by their vertically individualistic orientation, which promotes a
self-difference from the others (see Triandis and Gelfand, 1998). In contrast, New Zealanders
are discouraged from standing out, what they refer to as ‘‘Tall Poppy Syndrome,’’ and
individuals within their society are encouraged to blend in with the others (what Triandis and
Gelfand, 1998 call a horizontally individualistic orientation). Advertisers who do not
understand this distinction could be in for disastrous results if they placed advertisements
with ‘‘individuating’’ themes in NZ. Such appeals are likely to be viewed negatively and could
have an undesirable effect on the image of the brand.
The value–behavior relationship was also examined in more depth by focusing on the
different reasons why specific types of possessions were important for respondents from the
two countries. Hypothesis 2 was partially supported in that New Zealanders were much more
likely to identify plants and gardens as important possessions than were Americans, and
these possessions were more likely to be valued for environmental reasons. This result is
consistent with the differential importance that New Zealanders place on the value Harmony.
When recreational possessions were examined, however, the results were not consistent
with our expectations. New Zealanders, in comparison to Americans, identify interpersonal
reasons for the importance of recreational items, but they are no more likely to express
enjoyment reasons for recreational items than Americans.
Other results offer other insights not associated with the hypotheses. For example,
interesting results were found for home ownership. Compared to New Zealanders,
Americans were significantly more likely to express ‘‘identity’’ and ‘‘ownership’’ reasons why
their assets (i.e., houses) were important. Although neither group was significantly more or
less likely to identify houses as important possessions, their reasons were different —
providing a significant contrast in value systems. Whereas New Zealanders were more
concerned with the security provided by their homes and the interpersonal relationships that
are maintained there, Americans stated that owning a home was valued because of the
accomplishment it signified; the house was theirs, a part of who they are, and what they have
done.
The goal of this research was to apply Schwartz’s theory of values to explain
cross-cultural differences in possessions and the concomitant meaning of these for
marketing and advertising practice. The results suggest that this theoretical framework does
explain cross-cultural differences and can be used to garner insight into how the meanings of
important possessions differ across cultures. These findings offer an understanding of why
people in different cultures buy things and why they view some possessions as more
important than the others. Indeed, there does seem to be a connection between values and
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possessions; a connection that marketers can exploit. The results that were contrary to those
hypothesized need further inquiry. Perhaps, there are other forces operating in these cultures
that were not identified by the Schwartz typology. Future research needs to probe this
concern.
In summary, the Schwartz approach clearly has practical use. Even in situations in
which such differences are very subtle, as in the case of NZ and the United States, this
information can be very useful in the design of advertising appeals. Despite Levitt’s (1983)
argument that consumers throughout the world are becoming so similar that the globalization
of markets is inevitable, there is still a case to be made for the importance of cross-cultural
consumer research. Differences do exist, and a lack of recognition of this fact can
unnecessarily expose companies to risks that could have easily been avoided, even in
countries viewed as culturally very similar. This type of research provides an opportunity to
improve our understanding of consumption and to better understand consumers from an
international perspective — a fundamental concern as globalization accelerates.
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Appendix
Table 1: Schwartz’s seven cultural-level value types
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Table 2: Differences between Americans and New Zealanders for cultural-level values ANOVAs

Note: The mean importance rating for each value type was simply the average of the individual values that represent that particular value type.
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Table 3: Differences in private meanings of possessions for Americans
and New Zealanders
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Table 4: Differences in type of possessions for Americans and New Zealanders
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